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AD HOC ADJUDICATION: PEOPLE v. CHAMPION, ANOTH-
ER CONFUSING ELEMENT IN THE TURMOIL FOLLOWING
MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON
Picture two incidents separated by more than two hundred
years, but uniquely similar: a government search of a private
citizen suspected of committing a crime. A writ of assistance,
similar to a modern search warrant but affording greater police
discretion, justified the first search.' The plain feel doctrine jus-
tified the second search.2 This exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson,' allows an officer to
search for and seize contraband that is immediately apparent to
him during a patdown search for weapons.4
In 1756, two uniformed customs agents stopped a man sus-
pected of smuggling illegal goods into the colonies.5 Under the
guise of a writ of assistance, the officers searched his person and
his home in an effort to find damning evidence against him.'
The colonist was innocent, but the officers continued the search
in an attempt to find even the tiniest shred of evidence linking
him to the crime.7 After an unsuccessful search, the officers
vowed to return, as their search authority remained valid during
the reign of the monarch in power during their issuance.'
1. See generally JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH & SEIZURE & THE SUPREME
COURT 31 (1966) (discussing writ of assistance search powers); Tracey Maelin, The
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 219-24
(1993) (discussing analogous ex officio searches and writs of assistance).
2. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993). Many courts use the
phrases "plain feel" and "plain touch" interchangeably. This Note uses the term
"plain feel' throughout for consistency.
3. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
4. See id. at 375-76.
5. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 30-48 (outlining a detailed history
of British colonial practices that caused controversy among colonists and formed the
basis for the Bill of Rights); Maclin, supra note 1, at 219-24 (discussing the history
of the Fourth Amendment through an analysis of colonial search and seizure practic-
es before the Revolutionary War).
6. See generally Maclin, supra note 1, at 219-24 (describing the process of ex
officio searches and writs of assistance in the colonies).
7. See generally id. (illustrating the invasive nature of these searches).
8. See generally id. at 224 (describing the longevity of a writ).
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In 1996, two uniformed police officers stopped a man suspected
of possessing illegal narcotics in Michigan.9 Following clearly
enumerated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,"0 the officers
conducted a patdown search of his person and felt potential con-
traband in his pants." When the officers removed the question-
able object, they found a prescription pill bottle, a container that
is legal to possess. 2 The officers then invaded the sanctity of the
suspect's privacy interests by opening the container to discover
cocaine." During this final search, the officers' conduct more
closely resembled the custom agents' behavior in 1756 than con-
duct deemed allowable by Dickerson's plain feel exception. 4
Fortunately, from the time of the searches of the 1750s and
the searches of 1996, the U.S. Congress ratified the Fourth
Amendment to guarantee all citizens freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 Unfortunately, although the Framers
drafted the amendment to require a neutral magistrate to act as
a buffer in justifying warrants and protecting individual rights,
the Court has carved many exceptions into this protection. 6
Similarly, with the clear delineation of such exceptions to the
warrant requirement, including the doctrines of stop and
frisk, 7 plain view, 8 search incident to arrest," and plain
9. See People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 747 (1997).
10. See generally Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (creating the plain
feel exception to Terry searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing a brief
patdown search for weapons of a suspect if the officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicion concerning potential criminal activity by the suspect).
11. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 852.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
16. See infra notes 69-156 and accompanying text.
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
18. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) (plurality opinion).
19. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762, 768 (1969).
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feel,2" the courts have all too willingly extended the scope of
these exceptions as part of the war on drugs and crime in Amer-
ica.2 Although fighting drugs and crime is a laudable goal,
there is now overwhelming confusion surrounding the rights of
suspects at a very critical stage.'
One of the most confusing exceptions to the Fourth Amend-
ment stems from the Court's 1993 Dickerson decision.' In cre-
ating the plain feel doctrine, the Court expanded the Terry
patdown searches, specifically limited to weapons, to include the
discovery of contraband in the suspect's possession if the con-
traband is "immediately apparent" to the officer during the ini-
tial patdown.' When interpreting the plain feel doctrine, other
courts have taken Dickerson's standards and manipulated the
language to support the "proper" outcome of a case.' The cases
interpreting Dickerson's requirements establish seemingly
bright-line rules that should provide consistent interpretations
of the plain feel doctrine.26 The result, however, is inconsis-
tent.27 The cases delineate factors such as the officer's experi-
ence," the location of the contraband,29 and the packaging of
the contraband," and these factors have led to disparate re-
20. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
21. See, e.g., State v. White, 674 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). In the White
decision, the court acknowledged, w]e are keenly aware that the drug problem pos-
es a great threat to our nation and that the deterrence of drug activity is an over-
whelming public concern" and emphasized the importance of social policy as a guide
in judicial decision making. Id& at 411.
22. Justice Powell described the state of Fourth Amendment precedent most accu-
rately when he stated, "the law of search and seizure .. . is intolerably confusing."
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Many state
courts have contributed to this confusion by applying Dickerson's requirements incon-
sistently, leaving Fourth Amendment case law in a constant state of upheaval. See
infra text accompanying notes 157-218.
23. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76.
24. Id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 164-80.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 196-207.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 181-95.
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sults, ranging from the exclusion of evidence3' to the use of the
evidence to obtain a conviction against the defendant.32
These decisions illustrate a movement away from the initial
belief that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered"33 toward "common sense in law enforcement,"' a
change that does not reflect the rights of individuals under the
Fourth Amendment accurately. This trend is especially concern-
ing because, as the Court once stated, "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, un-
less by clear and unquestionable authority of the law." 5
This Note analyzes the impact of the plain feel exception to
the Fourth Amendment, focusing specifically on the confusion in
many jurisdictions resulting from the Court's original delinea-
tion of the doctrine in Dickerson and concludes that these inter-
pretations lead to varying results in jurisdictions construing the
plain feel doctrine. The first section briefly explores the history
of the Fourth Amendment and the importance of using a histori-
cal context in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The second sec-
tion addresses specific exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
carved out by the Court, including the doctrines of search inci-
dent to arrest," the Terry stop and frisk doctrine," the plain
view doctrine," and the plain feel doctrine;39 the Court's
31. Many courts have excluded evidence seized during a plain feel search. See,
e.g., Jordan v. State, 664 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Jackson v. State,
669 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); D.D. v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996); Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1994).
32. Many courts have admitted evidence seized from a plain feel search. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. State, 471 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Seaman v. State, 449 S.E.2d
526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Parker v. State, 662 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Peo-
ple v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997).
33. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
34. Marcia M. McBrien, Drugs Seized in 'Plain Feel' Search Admissible, MICH. L.
WKLY., July 15, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Milawr File (quot-
ing Saginaw County Prosecuting Attorney Michael D. Thomas's comments following
the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Champion).
35. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
36. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
37. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
39. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
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strange discussion of containers in relationship to these doc-
trines;4 ° and the Court's creation of an exclusionary rule.4' The
third section discusses the confusion resulting from an inconsis-
tent application of Dickerson and concludes that the Court must
address this confusion because individuals' Fourth Amendment
rights currently vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.42 The
fourth section addresses People v. Champion,43 a case that
clearly illustrates this confusion. This section argues that Cham-
pion is a rather tenuous opinion, focusing on factors that cannot
justify the court's ultimate finding of probable cause." Finally,
the last section discusses the policy implications of the plain feel
decisions and the need for a coherent rule concerning suspects'
Fourth Amendment rights following the Dickerson decision.45
This Note concludes that the plain feel doctrine, although ap-
plied inconsistently, is an important exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and the Supreme Court must
revisit the doctrine to reformulate the elements of such a search.
ENFORCING INDivIDUAL RIGHTS V. EFFICIENT LAW
ENFORCEMENT: THE TENUOUS BALANCE OF INTERESTS IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT
To understand the Fourth Amendment's exceptions, the un-
derlying premise of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be analyzed. Given the
disparity in potential interpretations, the historical underpin-
nings of the Fourth Amendment must be analyzed to determine
its raison d'gtre.
During the 1750s, British customs officers implemented ex
officio searches in the colonies.46 Under this authority, officials
conducted warrantless searches of private homes in search of
40. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
41. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 157-218.
43. 549 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997).
44. See id. at 853.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 272-328.
46. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 219.
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smuggled goods. 7 Ex officio searches were extremely unpopu-
lar, forming the basis for the British government's even more
controversial and unpopular writs of assistance and serving as
the precursor for the modern search warrant.4" To many colo-
nists, these searches were "two different sides of the same coin[,
as bloth allowed broad, discretionary governmental search power
without any requirement of specific cause or judicial over-
sight."49 These rampant abuses enraged the colonists.0
Similarly, colonial judges opposed the writs, claiming that the
writs had no legal basis and certainly afforded no opportunity
for judicial oversight.5 In contrast to modern search warrants,
these writs remained valid during the reign of the monarch and
did not require a special hearing before their issuance.52 Given
the highly controversial nature of the writs, judges began re-
jecting these writs by refusing to enforce them, ultimately be-
ginning the demise of such writs in colonial America."
With this background of unbridled police discretion, the Fram-
ers drafted a constitutional amendment, 4 broad enough in
scope to protect individuals' rights in situations such as unneces-
sarily intrusive searches of private homes.55 In response to the
colonists' experiences with these searches and the public outcry
against these writs, the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment
to encompass such abuses." The Fourth Amendment thus
stands as a guardian of individual liberty against the unbridled
discretion of the police.
47. See id.
48. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 31; Maclin, supra note 1, at 220-21. "The ob-
noxious feature of writs of assistance was their character as permanent search war-
rants placed in the hands of customs officials: they might be used with unlimited
discretion and were valid for the duration of the life of the sovereign." LANDYNSKI,
supra note 1, at 31.
49. Maclin, supra note 1, at 222-23.
50. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 36-38.
51. See id. at 33-35; Maclin, supra note 1, at 223-24.
52. See LANDYNSIG, supra note 1, at 31; Maclin, supra note 1, at 224.
53. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 33-35; Maclin, supra note 1, at 224-26.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 197.
56. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 41-42 (detailing the Framers' con-
cern for protecting citizens from unreasonable searches); Maclin, supra note 1, at
212-19 (discussing the Framers' motivations for writing the Fourth Amendment).
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One commentator has described the Fourth Amendment as
having "both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity."57
It is subject to much speculation and interpretation because of
its broadly sweeping language, leaving courts free to define the
term "unreasonable" using many methods of interpretation.58
Two schools of thought have emerged concerning constitutional
interpretation generally and in this context specifically.59
One view analyzes the wording of the Constitution, relying
solely on written words as the source for constitutional interpre-
tation." This textualist view emphasizes the plain meaning of
the words employed in the legislation itself.61 This approach
"read[s] constitutional provisions literally so that government is
permitted to do nothing more than what is explicitly stated in
the document."62 Following a textualist interpretation, the
Fourth Amendment merely guarantees reasonable police con-
duct; therefore, most police action in the area, although intru-
sive, will not be deemed unreasonable.'
Another approach follows a more liberal interpretation of the
Constitution, focusing on the need to have a pliable, living docu-
ment, relying heavily on the historical context of the Constitu-
tion." Supporters of this interpretivist approach believe one
can reach a better understanding of the meaning -of the words
used in the document itself by analyzing the Framers' intent.65
Under this view, the Fourth Amendment protects the individual
against the potential for illegal state action, and thus, govern-
57. LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 42.
58. See generally CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 95-98 (6th ed.
1996) (discussing and analyzing various theories of constitutional interpretation in-
cluding interpretivism and textualism).
59. See i&.; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, How TO READ THE CONSTITUTION 3-25 (1996)
(comparing various approaches to constitutional interpretation).
60. See DUCAT, supra note 58, at 95.
61. See id.
62. Id. Ducat also describes this form of interpretation as "essentially a mechani-
cal, uncreative enterprise." Id.
63. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 198-99.
64. See DUCAT, supra note 58, at 96.
65. See id.
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mental intrusions are violations of the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights."6
A literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would sug-
gest that its drafters merely intended a reasonableness standard
of analysis for rights in this area, but the historical context of
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment suggests a much differ-
ent approach.67 Because the colonists faced seemingly random,
warrantless searches of their private property and of their per-
son, the expansive discretion of the police is evident." This
Note, therefore, will explore the Fourth Amendment's exceptions
and their clear limitations within this context.
THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PLAIN FEEL DoCmINE
Realizing that certain situations, given their exigencies or oth-
er unique characteristics, could not conform to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirements, the Supreme Court began
carving exceptions to the rule in limited circumstances.69 Many
of these exceptions promoted the goals of preserving potential
66. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 201 & n.16.
67. See id. at 223-24; see also LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 42-43 (describing the
birth of the Fourth Amendment in light of British abuses of colonists' rights through
the implementation of ex officio searches and writs of assistance).
One of the clearest examples of the dichotomy between these two approaches to
constitutional interpretation lies within the Supreme Court's opinion in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). This case addressed the outer limits of the
Fourth Amendment in the context of wiretapping, see id. at 464, and pitted Chief
Justice Taft, a strict constructionist or textualist, see id. at 455, against Justice
Brandeis, a well-known interpretivist. See id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Finding that wiretapping fell outside the Fourth Amendment's protections, Chief
Justice Taft, relying on the plain meaning of the Amendment, declared that "[tihe
language of the [Fourth] Amendment can not be extended and expanded .... [TIhe
courts may not adopt.., a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning
to the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 465-66.
Justice Brandeis, however, disagreed strongly with this approach and chose in-
stead to focus on the policy behind the Fourth Amendment. He summarized, "[o
protect [the] right [to be left alone], every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 31; Maclin, supra note 1, at 223-24.
69. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-60 (1969) (defining a search inci-
dent to arrest as a justification for a warrantless search and tracing the develop-
ment of such an exception from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
through United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)).
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evidence70 and protecting the officer's safety.71 Similarly, the
Court justified these exceptions based on the low intrusion on
the suspect's rights and delineated the exceptions clearly and
explicitly to curb the discretion of individual officers in inter-
preting the parameters and guidelines of warrantless
searches.72
Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest
The most basic and least intrusive exception to the search
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment involves a
search incident to a lawful arrest.7" With a rich tradition of ju-
dicial acceptance, the Court enumerated this exception most
clearly in the 1969 case of Chimel v. California.74 While arrest-
ing Mr. Chimel for burglary, police officers searched his entire
home, opening drawers and moving objects in an attempt to find
evidence of Mr. Chimel's crime.75 According to the Court, it was
reasonable to allow the arresting officer to search a suspect for
weapons in an effort to protect the officer's safety, to preserve
the sanctity of the arrest, and to prevent the potential destruc-
tion of evidence.76 Similarly, the search could extend to the ar-
70. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
71. See id. at 763; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 3 (1968).
72. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
73. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
74. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court's acceptance of the doctrine of search incident
to arrest has deep roots. In 1914, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
the Court referred to the ability of the police "to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Id. at
392. Expanding on this philosophy, the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), extended the search provisions to include "whatever is found upon [a
suspect's] person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which
may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the
prosecution." Id. at 158. The final expansion of the doctrine of search incident to
arrest prior to Chimel came from the Court in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925), allowing the police to "search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed." Id. at 30.
75. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54.
76. See id. at 763.
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ea under the suspect's control for the reasons enumerated
above.77 The allowable scope of the search, however, could not
extend to rooms beyond the location of the suspect's arrest as
"[tihe 'adherence to judicial processes' mandated by the Fourth
Amendment requires no less.""s
Again in 1973, the Court undertook the process of refining the
doctrine of search incident to arrest in United States v. Robin-
son. 9 Following his arrest, the officer searched Mr. Robinson
and found a crumpled cigarette package. 0 Upon the officer's
continued inspection of the package, he discovered heroin cap-
sules within the package."' The Court in Robinson extended the
interpretation of the search incident to arrest doctrine to include
containers in the suspect's possession at the time of the ar-
rest.8 "The justification [for the search] ... rests quite as much
on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person
for later use at trial.""' This expansion laid the foundation for
the Court's consideration of searches of closed containers in sit-
uations other than a search incident to arrest."
Beyond the policy justifications for the search incident to ar-
rest, these searches have minimal intrusion on suspects' Fourth
Amendment rights because these individuals lost their liberty
during the lawful arrest that justified the search." Likewise,
these searches have deep roots. "[To protect the lives of the ar-
resting officers, to ensure that the fugitive would not escape, and
to prevent him from destroying the evidence of his crime," colo-
nial American laws acknowledged an exception to the warrant
requirements for a search pursuant to a lawful arrest."8 The
Court has thus justified the search incident to arrest exception
77. See id.
78. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))).
79. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
80. See id. at 223.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 236.
83. Id. at 234.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 112-21.
85. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
86. LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 98.
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to the warrant requirement based on factors such as the safety
of officers, the preservation of evidence, and a minimal intrusion
upon the suspect's rights."
Patdown Searches Under the Terry Doctrine
In 1968, the Court carved another exception into the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' If an officer has articulable, individualized suspicion
of a suspect's criminal activity, then he may conduct a limited
patdown search for weapons of the suspect." The Terry patdown
emerged during the Court's attempt to balance the safety concerns
of individual officers who must risk their lives fighting crime
against the constitutional rights of suspects.' Concluding that
"[tihe protective search for weapons,.., constitutes a brief,
though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person," the Court upheld the officer's limited patdown search of a
suspect who may be armed and dangerous.9
To limit the intrusion upon the suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights, the Court delineated a test to ensure the protection of
these rights while preserving the officer's safety.92 This test al-
lows the police officer "to conduct a carefully limited search [for
weapons] of the outer clothing" of a suspect, provided that the
officer reasonably believes his safety is in jeopardy.93 This rea-
sonable belief must be justified by individualized, articulable
suspicion concerning the suspect's criminal activity and a contin-
ued fear for one's safety following the officer's inquiry into the
suspect's motives.94 Any weapons discovered during the officer's
patdown search are admissible against the suspect without vio-
87. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
88. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
89. See id. at 30.
90. See id. at 10.
91. Id. at 26.
92. See id. at 27.
93. Id. at 30.
94. See id.
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lating his Fourth Amendment rights. 5
In a lengthy analysis of the competing interests involved in
Terry, the Court emphasized its responsibility "to guard against
police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upoh personal security without the objective evidentia-
ry justification which the Constitution requires."96 This decision
carved a very limited exception into the Fourth Amendment de-
spite the recognized potential for unauthorized police discretion
in this area.9' Unfortunately, the Court's creation of this stop
and frisk exception illustrates just the beginning of exceptions
authorized by the Court in the Fourth Amendment realm.
The Warrantless Seizure of Items in Plain View
Just a few years after Terry v. Ohio,98 the seizure of an item
in the plain view of an officer became another important excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.99 Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire created the plain view doctrine.0 0 In
Coolidge, the plurality announced that during the course of a
legal search, whether authorized by a warrant or by one of the
enumerated exceptions, an officer who inadvertently discovers an
"article of incriminating character" may seize the item without a
warrant provided that the item was in "plain view."' The
plain view doctrine relies on the philosophy that it would be un-
fair to blind police officers to contraband or evidence of a crime
merely because a search warrant did not enumerate these items
specifically and that the subsequent intrusion into the
individual's Fourth Amendment rights is slight because a war-
rant justifies the original search.0 2
95. See id. at 31.
96. Id. at 15.
97. See id.
98. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
99. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445-90 (1971) (plurality opinion).
100. See id. at 465 (plurality opinion).
101. Id. (plurality opinion). According to the plurality, in this case, the defendant's
conviction was improper because a neutral magistrate did not issue the warrant
justifying the officer's search, see id. at 453 (plurality opinion); therefore, the princi-
ples of the plain view doctrine could not justify an already invalid search. See id.
(plurality opinion).
102. See id. at 467 (plurality opinion).
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In 1987, the Court clarified the plain view doctrine in Arizona
v. Hicks.' While conducting a valid search, police officers dis-
covered stereo components they believed to be stolen."4 The
officers touched and moved the goods as they recorded the serial
numbers on the components." 5 The Court invalidated the
search because the officers' actions "produce[d] a new invasion of
respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance
that validated the entry.""" The Court held that the plain view
doctrine involved a line of vision test, requiring the officer to
actually see, in plain view, not hidden in a drawer or out of the
officer's sight, an item that he has probable cause to believe is
contraband.' The officer cannot create probable cause on the
basis of something that is not immediately apparent to him, in
this case, not in his line of sight.' 8 Excluding the fruits of the
search of the respondent's apartment, the Court in Hicks clari-
fied that the plain view doctrine required probable cause for an
officer to seize an item.' 9 These standards support the under-
lying requirement of the plain view doctrine that the item in
plain view must be immediately apparent as contraband or as
evidence of a crime."0 Otherwise, the seizure of such an item
could not be justified without a warrant."'
103. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
104. See id. at 323.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 325.
107. See id. at 326.
108. See id. The officer determined the stereo did not belong to the suspect only
after viewing the serial numbers. See id. at 323. The officer, however, could not see
the serial numbers without manipulating the stereo's position. See id.
109. See id. at 326. The Court went on to conclude that "[o reason is apparent
why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated
search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same
object if it had been known to be on the premises." Id. at 327.
110. See id. at 326.
111. See id. at 326-27.
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Privacy Expectations and the Allowable Scope of Searches Within
Closed Containers
In defining the appropriate scope of a search, whether a war-
rant or an exception to the warrant requirement justifies the
search, the requirements for the search of a closed container
differ from the requirements for the search of other items." In
1983, the Court addressed the search of a container carried by a
suspect in United States v. Place."' After arousing the suspi-
cion of officers in Miami International Airport, Mr. Place's point
of departure, the officers at LaGuardia Airport, Mr. Place's des-
tination, detained him after his arrival."" Subsequently, the
officers searched his bags."' During this ninety-minute search,
the officers discovered cocaine in Mr. Place's luggage." 6 The
Court balanced Mr. Place's privacy interest in his personal pos-
sessions against the police interest in enforcing the law."' This
balancing test led directly to the distinction in intrusiveness
between a seizure and a search of the container."' In conclud-
ing that the seizure of Mr. Place's luggage for ninety minutes
was unreasonable, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of
allowing the seizure and search of such a container in different
circumstances."'
112. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983).
113. See Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 698-99.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 703.
118. See id. at 705-06; see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("The [Fourth] Amendment protects two different interests of the
citizen-the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintain-
ing personal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter.").
119. See Place, 462 U.S. at 710; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576
(1991) (determining that the search of a container within a vehicle was allowable
under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendments warrant requirement).
Based on the exigent circumstances that justify the warrantless search of a vehicle,
containers located within an automobile have the same potential for flight, given
their location. Similarly, according to the Court, one's privacy expectation within a
vehicle is much lower there than in any other location, justifying the greater intru-
sion of searching a closed container within an automobile. See id. at 574. Ultimately,
the Court in Acevedo concluded "that automobile searches differ from other searches,"
and as such, different standards apply to these situations. Id. at 578.
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Searching containers during the course of another search is
more intrusive than a search of a person, given the higher degree
of privacy associated with personal possessions."'0 This height-
ened scrutiny, however, does not apply to all forms of closed con-
tainers. 2' The container doctrine thus applies only in connection
with an authorized exception to the warrant requirement.
Merging Terry and Plain View into a Plain Feel Exception
In 1993 in Minnesota v. Dickerson,22 the Supreme Court
created a hybrid exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment by combining the principles enumerated in
Terry v. Ohio' with the plain view doctrine as outlined in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.24 In Dickerson, while conducting
a lawful Terry patdown search, a police officer felt and seized
what he perceived to be contraband after manipulating the ob-
ject in his fingers."2 Although the Court invalidated the sei-
zure in Dickerson, the officer's conduct became the basis for yet
another exception to the Fourth Amendment. 26 To create the
parameters for a plain feel search, this new exception combined
the limited scope of the Terry patdown with the immediately
apparent requirement of the plain view doctrine.' 7 The plain
feel doctrine, thus, hinges on the officer's ability to feel imme-
diately the contraband nature of an item while conducting a
minimally intrusive patdown of the suspect's outer clothing."
120. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring)) (holding that personal searches are more intrusive than automobile
searches).
121. See supra note 119 (discussing containers located within an automobile).
122. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
123. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
124. 403 U.S. 443, 464-72 (1971) (plurality opinion).
125. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 369.
126. See id. at 376-78.
127. See id. at 375-79.
128. See id. at 375. This immediately apparent requirement caused the downfall of
the officer's search in Dickerson because the officer did not suspect contraband until
he had manipulated the contents of the defendant's pockets. See id. at 376-78.
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Plain feel searches hinge on an officer's determination of prob-
able cause; therefore, the Court concluded that such a search
does not violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.29 The
Terry standard merely required a reasonable, individualized sus-
picion by the officer, a much lower standard than probable
cause.' 0 The plain view exception requires the higher standard
of probable cause, rather than mere reasonable suspicion, be-
cause the item seized was not authorized by a warrant or an
exception that originally justified the search,' 3' and because
the plain feel doctrine is an amalgamation of the Terry search
and a plain view search, it also requires this higher thresh-
old." 2 Likewise, because the need to protect the officer's safety
justifies neither plain view nor plain feel searches, such searches
require a greater justification for intrusion. 3'
The search of Mr. Dickerson went beyond the simple patdown
advocated by the Court; therefore, the search was too intrusive,
and the contraband seized during the search was inadmissible at
trial.' The officer's manipulation of the lump in the suspect's
pocket more closely paralleled the inadmissible search of Hicks
than the permissible search of Terry.3 5
Dickerson hinged on the timing of the officer's decision that
the item he perceived was contraband. 3 ' The officer failed to
identify immediately the contraband nature of the lump; thus,
the search became too intrusive, and the evidence seized became
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule."7 For a search to be
129. See id. at 376. Although officers determine probable cause through the
analysis of many factors specific to each case, the underlying premise of probable
cause includes "evidence which would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a felony has been committed." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
130. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
131. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
132. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376.
133. See id. at 378-79. To counterbalance concerns about the reliability of the
officer's sense of touch, the Court required that the contraband be immediately ap-
parent to satisfy a probable cause determination. According to the Court, this strict
standard "only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of un-
seen contraband." Id.
134. See id. at 379.
135. See id. at 378-79.
136. See id.
137. See id. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, see infra text accompanying
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valid under the plain feel doctrine, therefore, the nature of the
contraband must be immediately apparent.118 This requirement
stems from the plain view search requirements.'39 Unfortu-
nately, this requirement provides the source of much confusion
concerning the current state of this exception.
The Exclusionary Rule: Excluding Evidence Obtained Outside
the Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The Court's delineation of multiple exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment expanded the allowable
scope of police searches. 40 Yet, some searches still fall outside
these wide boundaries. One such search occurred in 1961 in
Mapp v. Ohio.' In Mapp, three police officers arrived at Ms.
Mapp's home because they suspected that she had information
about a recent bombing in Cleveland." Upon their arrival, the
officers requested permission to enter her home, but Ms. Mapp
refused.' The officers forcefully entered her home hours later,
wielding a paper purporting to be a search warrant for her
home.' During their search, the officers took items out of
drawers, overturned pieces of furniture, and finally discovered
obscene materials used to arrest Ms. Mapp.45
During the trial, the prosecution failed to produce the search
warrant that the officers used to justify their search of Ms. Mapp's
home, but the state attempted to use the fruits, or evidence, of this
search against Ms. Mapp.' The Supreme Court rejected the use
of these papers, following the precedent of a federal exclusionary
rule created in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.47 In Weeks, the
notes 140-56.
138. See id.
139. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 69-139.
141. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
142. See id. at 644.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 645.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 647-48 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
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Supreme Court barred the admission of evidence seized without a
warrant for federal prosecutions. " 8 Extending this exclusion to
state court proceedings, the majority in Mapp sustained the force
of the Fourth Amendment by rejecting evidence seized contrary to
the Amendment's requirements."
Critics of the exclusionary rule claim that it hinders the truth-
seeking process of the criminal justice system.50 One outspo-
ken critic of the exclusionary rule is New York Superior Court
Judge Harold Rothwax. Articulating the views of many critics of
the exclusionary rule, he stated, "with many of the exclusionary
rules, we are dealing with unquestionably reliable and highly
probative evidence; when we exclude it, we are hampering the
fact finders (the judge or jury) in their quest of the full
truth."5
1
Although the foundation of the exclusionary rule involves the
exclusion of evidence from trial, the rule itself serves to protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals rather than to
hamper the fact-finding process.'52 "The ignoble shortcut to
conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire sys-
tem of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest";5 3 therefore, the exclusionary rule forces the govern-
ment to abide by the rights preserved by its citizens, and in this
guarantee, it legitimizes the criminal justice system, forbidding
148. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are con-
cerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id.
149. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
150. See JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAx, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
26 (1996).
151. Id.
152. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-59; see also Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudi-
cation and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 331
(1973) (advocating the use of the exclusionary rule because it frees "us from unlaw-
ful police invasions of our security and [it] maintain[s] the integrity of our institu-
tions .... The innocent and society are the principal beneficiaries of the
exclusionary rule.").
153. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
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the government from advocating illegal behavior."5  The
exclusionary rule, therefore, must be analyzed in connection
with the exceptions to the warrant requirement, as an item need
not be excluded unless its seizure is improper, i.e., its seizure
did not follow the scope of the Fourth Amendment or an allow-
able exception to the warrant requirement.'55 If a search fails
the requirements of one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, then the exclusionary rule dictates the exclusion of the
seized item from trial.'56
THE POST-DICKERSON CONFUSION CONCERNING THE
IMMEDIATELY APPARENT REQUIREMENT OF PLAIN FEEL
Following Minnesota v. Dickerson,167 state courts have ad-
dressed the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in an
attempt to create consistency within the plain feel doctrine. Yet,
the result is an even more confusing body of law. Cases address-
ing and interpreting the plain feel doctrine focus almost entirely
on specific facts, unique to each case, rather than on the under-
lying principles of the plain feel doctrine.'58 These cases ad-
dress issues including the officer's experience,'59 the packaging
of the contraband,"ic the location of the contraband,'' and
the type of container, if any, in which the contraband is
hidden.6 ' Using these factors, state court decisions vary signif-
icantly in the importance afforded each factor, leading to dispa-
rate results in applying the plain feel doctrine. 6 '
154. See id. at 657-60.
155. See id. at 654.
156. See id. at 647-48.
157. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 164-218.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 164-80.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 181-95.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 196-207.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 208-18.
163. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing the varying results
from an inconsistent application of the plain feel doctrine).
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Justifying Plain Feel Searches Based on the Experience of the
Officer Conducting the Search
State courts have wrestled with concerns about the officer's
experience at identifying narcotics during cursory searches. The
aspects of an officer's experience discussed in the case law in-
clude the officer's tenure on the force,"M the number of narcot-
ics arrests conducted by the officer,'65 and the officer's ability
to feel contraband through multiple layers of clothing.'66 This
seemingly neutral standard produces a wide range of results in
practice.
In Jordan v. State,6" a police officer conducted a patdown
search during a routine traffic stop.'68 The officer discovered
crack cocaine in Mr. Jordan's pocket while conducting the
search.'69 The court suppressed the evidence because, at trial,
the officer, although a five-year veteran on the force, could not
state the number of times he had seized crack cocaine during a
patdown search. 7 ° The officer's failure to describe his experi-
ence identifying contraband during a patdown search led the
court to conclude that the immediately apparent requirement of
Dickerson was unsatisfied.'
In marked contrast, in Andrews v. State,'72 the court found
that the officer's experience justified the patdown search.'
When the police responded to a robbery call, they confronted Mr.
Andrews in a nearby hotel.74 Upon their arrival, the police
164. See Jordan v. State, 664 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
165. See Andrews v. State, 471 S.E.2d 567, 568 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
166. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, No. 9577CR-3107, 1996 WL 339948, at *5 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 21, 1996).
167. 664 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
168. See id. at 273.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 274.
171. See id.
172. 471 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
173. See id. at 568-69; see also Commonwealth v. Lopez, No. 9577CR-3107, 1996
WL 339948, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 21, 1996) (admitting crack cocaine seized
by experienced officers into evidence). In Lopez, the officer "knew precisely what he
was encountering as soon as he placed his hand on the bulge under the defendant's
clothing." Lopez, 1996 WL 339948, at *5.
174. See Andrews, 471 S.E.2d at 568.
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discovered marijuana paraphernalia in plain view.'75 This dis-
covery created the individualized suspicion required to justify a
patdown search of Mr. Andrews. 76 During this search, the offi-
cer felt a cookie of crack cocaine, and given his "seven years' ex-
perience" and "thousands of narcotics-related arrests," the court
upheld the admissibility of the cocaine seized.'77
Ironically, this officer only had two more years of experience
than the officer in Jordan; however, the court in Andrews
reached a remarkably different result. Both courts based their
decisions to admit or deny the use of the seized evidence on the
officers' experience; yet, the experience of the officers in these
cases is not as disparate as the results would imply.78
Courts following an Andrews analysis presume that an
officer's training gives him or her the ability to perceive contra-
band through multiple layers of clothing during a quick, cursory
search. 79 This presumption carries much less weight with
courts following a Jordan line of reasoning because those courts
require much more significant proof of the officer's tactile skills
before admitting the fruits of these searches. 8 ° The disagree-
ment on this issue alone illustrates the lack of continuity across
the country in interpreting Dickerson's standards. Likewise, this
distinction contains inconsistent presumptions, producing dispa-
rate results in court decisions attempting to use the officer's ex-
perience as a factor in determining if the Dickerson immediately
apparent requirement is satisfied.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Compare Jordan v. State, 664 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (hold-
ing that a five-year veteran lacked experience to immediately identify the contraband)
with Andrews, 471 S.E.2d at 568 (determining that seven years of police work consti-
tuted enough experience to satisfy Dickerson's immediately apparent requirement).
179. See Andrews, 471 S.E.2d at 568.
180. See Jordan, 664 So. 2d at 274.
1998] 1023
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1003
Using the Nature and Packaging of the Contraband to Justify a
Seizure Under Dickerson
Jurisdictions also disagree over the packaging of the contra-
band, providing a further impediment to the immediately appar-
ent requirement of Dickerson. The thinner the packaging, the
more likely a court will accept the assertion that the officer
could immediately identify the contraband. 8'
In Seaman v. State,182 a patdown search produced a plastic
baggie that, upon further visual inspection, contained marijua-
na." Because the officer did not manipulate the baggie in or-
der to determine its contraband nature, the court upheld this
discovery.' In fact, the officer felt the contraband through the
plastic packaging; therefore, the search satisfied the immediate-
ly apparent requirement of Dickerson according to the court."
Indiana faced a similar case in Parker v. State.'86 In Parker,
the officer discovered cocaine in a baggie located in the suspect's
pocket.8 7 Because the officer's "tactile sense, found contraband
that he instantly ascertained was cocaine," the search satisfied
the immediately apparent requirement." Some courts have
accepted readily the officer's sense of touch in determining con-
traband when contained by thin packaging.'89
Other courts, however, have found that contraband located
within a container was not immediately apparent to the officer
and was, therefore, inadmissible at trial. In Commonwealth v.
Crowder,9 ' the police officer conducted a patdown search of
the suspect and felt what may have been "a bindle of drugs" or
181. See Seaman v. State, 449 S.E.2d 526, 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
182. 449 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
183. See id. at 527.
184. See id.
185. See id.; see also State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(feeling small lumps inside a baggie during a patdown search justified the seizure).
186. 662 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
187. See id. at 999.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., id.; Allen v. State, 689 So. 2d 212, 216-17 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)
(admitting marijuana found within a small manila envelope under the plain feel ex-
ception to the warrant requirement).
190. 884 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1994).
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"a small gumball" in the suspect's pocket.19' The officer's un-
certainty concerning the nature of the contraband failed the
immediately apparent requirement; therefore, the subsequent
seizure of the item violated Dickerson's plain feel require-
ments.' Although a plastic baggie held the contraband, the
Kentucky court required a higher standard of tactile skill from
its officers than other courts.'93 This decision and others con-
tributed to the current confusion surrounding the Dickerson
decision.
Ironically, once again, very similar factors led different state
courts to disparate conclusions in interpreting Dickerson's re-
quirements. Some courts believed that a baggie containing drugs
did not act as a further impediment to the officer's sense of
touch." Other courts concluded that a container caused the
contraband to be less than immediately apparent; thus, the
search failed to satisfy one element of the plain feel doctrine.'95
The Location of the Contraband as a Factor in Determining Its
Immediately Apparent Nature
The area in which the police officer discovers the contraband
during a patdown search provides yet another factor courts con-
sider when determining if the contraband was immediately ap-
parent. Contraband discovered in a suspect's pocket raises com-
peting views on the strictness of the immediately apparent re-
quirement. In Commonwealth v. Dorsey,'96 the court addressed
a Dickerson patdown search that produced a bag of marijuana
from the suspect's pocket.'97 Fearing that "[riejection of the
[plain feel] doctrine would merely require an officer to ignore
191. Id. at 650 (quoting the testimony of Officer Sanford).
192. See idL at 652; see also State v. White, 674 N.E.2d 405, 410-11 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (determining that a "balled up" object located in the defendant's sock, later
determined to be contraband, was inadmissible).
193. See Crowder, 884 S.W.2d at 652.
194. See Parker, 662 N.E.2d at 999.
195. See Crowder, 884 S.W.2d at 652.
196. 654 A.2d 1086 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
197. See id. at 1087.
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that which, as the result of training, experience and common
sense, is known to be contraband," the court admitted the seized
contraband into evidence.'98 The balance between the suspect's
privacy interests and the officer's intuition weighed in favor of
law enforcement in this case.'99
An Indiana court reached a different conclusion while analyz-
ing very similar facts. In D.D. v. State,"' the officer conducting
a patdown search of the suspect discovered rocks of cocaine in
the suspect's pants pocket.20' The officer testified that upon
touching the item he felt it to be contraband generally but could
not specifically identify the object without actually removing it
from the suspect's pocket.22 This testimony proved that the
officer's sense of touch was not accurate enough to justify the
search.03 The officer lacked probable cause to conduct a fur-
ther investigation of the potential contraband."°' To "ensure[]
against excessively speculative seizures," the seizure of the con-
traband was inadmissible at trial because it failed to meet the
immediately apparent test.0 5
Given the disparate results illustrated above, the location of
the contraband clearly does not provide a bright-line rule to de-
termine if the contraband is immediately apparent. The location
of the contraband within a suspect's pocket has led some courts
to conclude that the officer's sense of touch was not accurate
enough to determine the contraband nature of the item.2"6 Oth-
er courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion.2 7
This dichotomy illustrates the confusion surrounding the courts'
attempts at identifying factors that are useful in analyzing the
immediately apparent requirement of a plain feel search.
198. Id. at 1089.
199. See id.
200. 668 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
201. See id. at 1251.
202. See id. at 1253.
203. See id. at 1254.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 654 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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Contraband Within an Opaque Container: Can This Be
Immediately Apparent?
Contraband hidden within an opaque container creates an
additional burden for police officers attempting to conduct a
Dickerson patdown search. In order to meet the immediately ap-
parent requirement of the plain feel doctrine, the officer must feel
the contraband and clearly identify it during the cursory
search."' 8 Because the container conceals the contraband inside,
it is much more difficult for the officer to identify the contraband
immediately. This issue has plagued the courts, especially given
the wide range of containers used to carry contraband.
In Jackson v. State,"9 officers found contraband within a
partially transparent prescription pill bottle during a patdown
search. 10 The container held a white chunky substance that
the officer identified as cocaine, although he did not testify that
he "instantly recognized" the contraband to be cocaine.21' Be-
cause the officer failed to recognize the contraband immediately
and because the container had illegal as well as legal uses, the
search and seizure of the cocaine were illegal because of the
cocaine's location within a container.2"2
Similarly, in United States v. Ross,213 while conducting a
patdown search, an officer discovered a seemingly empty
matchbox located in the suspect's groin region. 4 The officer
testified that he continued his inspection of the matchbox be-
cause it could have contained a razor blade or contraband.2 5
The court concluded that the immediately apparent requirement
of Dickerson could not be satisfied in this situation unless the
208. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
209. 669 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
210. See id. at 746.
211. Id. at 749.
212. See id.
213. 827 F. Supp. 711, 713 (S.D. Ala. 1993).
214. See id. at 713; see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 685 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996), appeal denied, 695 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1997) (determining that because an envelope
cannot contain a potential weapon, the search produced inadmissible evidence).
215. See Ross, 827 F. Supp. at 714.
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officer opened the matchbox, and "[nleither Dickerson nor Terry
allow such action."21
The court distinguished Ross on the basis of the container
holding the contraband, stating, "knowledge' under Dickerson
really translates into 'suspicion' if one considers that an officer
cannot truly verify the illegal character of a substance without
looking at it and, perhaps, testing it."217 The court concluded
that the "holding in this case might have been different if Ross
ha[d] been carrying the cocaine simply in a plastic baggie in his
pelvic area, through which the contours or mass of contraband
could be sensed."218 The location of the contraband within an-
other container, one that has a purpose other than carrying
illegal narcotics, is therefore an important distinction. Not all
courts, however, have found that a container prohibited the use
of the plain feel doctrine in seizing contraband located within it.
PEOPLE V. CHAMPION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFUSING STATE
OF THE PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE FOLLOWING DICKERSON
The Situation in Saginaw
On April 9, 1990, two officers patrolling a high crime area in
Saginaw, Michigan, witnessed a man approach their marked car
and flee down an alley."9 While pursuing this man, the officers
encountered two other men exiting a parked car and walking
away from the approaching officers.' 0 One of the officers recog-
nized Mr. Champion, the driver who was walking away with his
hands in his sweatpants, as a convicted felon.22' On four sepa-
rate occasions, the officers instructed Mr. Champion to stop, but
he did not, and when the police finally caught him, they conducted
a Terry patdown search.2" The search resulted in one of the
216. Id. at 719.
217. Id. at 719 n.15.
218. Id.
219. See People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Mich. 1996), cert denied, 117
S. Ct. 747 (1997).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 852.
222. See id.
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officer's feeling a pill bottle located in Mr. Champion's groin.223
Attempting to follow the requirements of Dickerson's plain feel
doctrine, the officer removed a brown plastic pill bottle from Mr.
Champion's pants." The search followed the Dickerson guide-
lines, occurring after the officer formed individualized,
articulable suspicion concerning Mr. Champion's potential crimi-
nal activity.' The officer, however, continued his inspection
by opening the pill bottle, and upon this greater intrusion, he
discovered cocaine and arrested the suspect."6 This second
search is troubling because the officers found the contraband
within a hard container.2 The court of appeals found this sub-
sequent search to be much more intrusive than the initial
search, although the Michigan Supreme Court reversed this
decision and upheld the intrusion.2"
The Majority Opinion: Applying the Hybrid Plain Feel Doctrine
Through Terry, Plain View, and Search Incident to Arrest
In analyzing the appropriateness of the seizure, the Michigan
Supreme Court traced the allowable reaches of the patdown,
determining that the search was admissible initially under the
Terry doctrine.229 Because the officer had "particularized suspi-
cion," the patdown was appropriate under Terry."3
Once the officer satisfied the Terry requirements, the analysis
next addressed the requirements of a plain view seizure, the un-
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 853.
226. See id. at 852.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 860, rev'g 518 N.W.2d 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
229. See id. at 853.
230. Id. The court enumerated many factors that contributed to the determination
of individualized suspicion including- the suspect's location in a high crime area; the
suspect initially walked away from the approaching officers; the officers knew of Mr.
Champion's criminal background; and Mr. Champion walked with his hands tucked
in his sweatpants, refusing to move them when commanded to do so by the officers.
See id.
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derpinning doctrine of the Dickerson standard."' In a plain
view seizure, the seized item must be immediately apparent as
contraband to establish the requisite probable cause for the
search. 2 Dickerson requires a probable cause determination
for the search, illustrating the plain feel doctrine's coalescence of
Terry and plain view.23 Using the factors that contributed to a
determination of individualized suspicion, the Champion majori-
ty determined that the totality of the circumstances satisfied
both the Dickerson probable cause standard and the immediately
apparent requirement of Hicks.'
Using the same standard, however, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals reached a remarkably different conclusion than the Michi-
gan Supreme Court."5 "Merely from feeling the contours of a
pill bottle," the officer immediately identified the item as a pill
bottle and nothing more; therefore, the officers did not find the
pill bottle during the scope of a proper Dickerson search, and the
court of appeals excluded it from evidence. 6 The court of ap-
peals differentiated between contraband located in a suspect's
pocket in a thin baggie and contraband located within a hard
container. 7 Using this benchmark, the scope of Dickerson
does not extend to searching closed containers because "a closed
container may contain any number of innocent and legal items
[and] ... generally requires visual inspection to determine its
contents."25
231. See id. at 854.
232. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Oddly enough, the court in Cham-
pion acknowledged that the seizure in Hicks was inappropriate because the officer
had to manipulate the stereo in order to view the serial numbers, and it thus failed
to meet the immediately apparent standard. See id. at 323. The officer "could not
form probable cause upon viewing the object, but had to manipulate the object, going
beyond the authorized plain view search." Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 855 (emphasis
added). The court failed to equate the manipulation in Hicks with the officer's open-
ing of the pill bottle in Champion. Instead, the Court in Champion distinguished the
cases on a technicality. See id. at 859.
233. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993).
234. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856.
235. See People v. Champion, 518 N.W.2d 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 549
N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997).
236. Id. at 522.
237. See id.
238. Id.
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The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed strongly with this
strict application of the immediately apparent requirement."9
Instead, it found that a search incident to arrest, rather than
the plain feel doctrine, validated the subsequent search of the
contents of the pill bottle." ° During this muddled analysis, the
court held that the totality of the circumstances justifying the
search of Mr. Champion provided the basis for the probable
cause determination required by the plain view and plain feel
standards, rather than the probable cause standard required of
a search incident to arrest. " The probable cause for plain
view justifies the seizure of the item,' 2 although the standard
for a search incident to arrest merely reflects the officer's deter-
mination of probable cause to arrest the suspect, two inherently
different standards. 3
In wrestling with the applicable doctrines in an effort to admit
the pill bottle, the court used skewed and often contradictory
logic. In one paragraph, the majority opinion "disagree[d] with
the distinction between the plain feel of contraband versus the
plain feel of an object containing contraband [as] [sluch a dis-
tinction should be immaterial where probable cause exists
and... serve[s] only to encourage better packaging of illicit
drugs."' Paragraphs later, the court scoffed at the court of
appeals' conclusion that the officer could not have concluded that
the pill bottle contained contraband, using the plain view stan-
dard to supplement the officer's plain feel of the pill bottle.2"
239. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 861.
240. See id.
241. See id. The majority's determination of probable cause relied in part on their
assumption that no one would carry prescription medication, in a pill bottle, in their
pants. See id. at 859. "We cannot imagine that any reasonable person in Officer
Todd's position, given all of the above circumstances, could have concluded that Mr.
Champion was carrying prescription medication, or any other legitimate item, in the
pill bottle in his groin region." Id.
242. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
243. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 249, 251-52 (differentiating between probable cause to arrest and
probable cause to search).
244. Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856 n.8.
245. See id.
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Implying that the officer's touch immediately identified the con-
traband nature of the pill bottle's contents, the opinion conclud-
ed that "Officer Todd did not further manipulate or grope the
object in order to determine its incriminating character."6 The
plain feel doctrine thus allowed the removal of the pill bottle
from Mr. Champion's pocket because the officer had probable
cause based on the totality of the circumstances to believe the
container held contraband. 7
The most tenuous portion of the court's reasoning lies within
the analysis of the doctrine of search incident to arrest. Justify-
ing the more intrusive search of opening the pill bottle, the court
reasoned that the officer's determination of probable cause to
believe that the pill bottle contained contraband equated to
probable cause sufficient to arrest the suspect."5 This logic,
however, is circular. A search incident to arrest occurs only after
the suspect's arrest for criminal activity. 9 The officer per-
ceived the contraband and discovered Mr. Champion's crime
after the search within the container; therefore, the search into
the pill bottle could not have occurred incident to arrest."
The probable cause needed to conduct an arrest requires "an
arresting officer... [to] possess information demonstrating
probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred and that
the defendant committed it"; 1 however, the court failed to
identify any factors that could support such a finding.12 Proba-
246. Id. at 858 (emphasis added).
247. See id. at 861.
248. See id. at 860-61.
249. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968). In Sibron, the Supreme
Court, in analyzing a search incident to arrest, determined "[ilt is axiomatic that an
incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification." Id.
at 63 (emphasis added). It is therefore troubling that the majority relied heavily on
a search incident to arrest to justify the police conduct when the officers formulated
probable cause for the search only after the completion of the search. See Champion,
549 N.W.2d at 862.
250. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 860-61.
251. Id. at 860 (emphasis added). Although the court quoted a Michigan statute
codifying probable cause, this definition is fairly typical of the requirements for prob-
able cause in many jurisdictions. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(defining the elements of probable cause to arrest).
252. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 861. The court identified many factors, but
none of them articulated a reasonable belief that Mr. Champion committed a crime.
Instead, the factors were biased and vague, including the location of the pill bottle,
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ble cause for an arrest existed through the court's reliance on
the circumstances enumerated that gave the officer probable
cause to conduct the initial patdown search. 3 Because the pill
bottle was within an area of the suspect's control at the time of
the arrest, the doctrine of search incident to arrest justified its
opening to prevent the potential destruction of evidence.'
The Dissent: Policy Reasons Why the Scope of the Search
Exceeded the Officer's Authority
Using the same hybrid analysis as the majority opinion, the
dissent focused on the limitations given under each of the doc-
trines used by the majority to bolster the admissibility of the pill
bottle into evidenceY5 Focusing on the limited scope allowed
by a Terry search, Chief Justice Brickley determined that the
majority ignored the limitations enumerated in Terry, and in
this ignorance, took a "treacherous step, facilitating the danger
the Dickerson Court warned of, 'that officers will enlarge a spe-
cific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into
the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at
will." 6 Chief Justice Brickley analyzed Mr. Champion's situa-
tion under the Terry doctrine because Dickerson merely extend-
ed the Terry stop and frisk patdown to include searches of con-
Mr. Champion's furtive glances, his past criminal record, and the high crime neigh-
borhood in which the offense occurred. The court found these factors indicated Mr.
Champion's propensity to commit a crime, rather than illustrating his actual com-
mission of a crime. See id. In fact, in United States v. Gibson, 19 F.3d 1449 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), the court declared, "[tihe Fourth Amendment stands in the way of the
police arresting people simply because they appear suspicious and may be hiding
something." Id. at 1452 (excluding evidence that the police officer discovered during
a plain feel search because the flat, angular substance was unidentifiable to the of-
ficer as contraband).
253. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 861.
254. See id.; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (articu-
lating the policies underlying the search incident to arrest doctrine).
255. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 861 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 863 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))).
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traband 7 He noted that the officer's determination that the
pill bottle was not a weapon served as the line of demarcation be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable police conduct in this
case.25 His analysis relied on the premise in Ter7y that a search
"in the absence of probable cause to arrest... must, like any
other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation." 9
Similarly, the Court in Terry and Dickerson specifically recog-
nized restrictions on the scope of the allowable patdown search in
an effort to protect citizens against overzealous police con-
duct.26 The precedent in the plain feel doctrine, therefore, is
restrictive rather than inclusive, according to the dissent.26' The
dissent concluded correctly that the officer's sense of touch could
not have perceived the contraband within the pill bottle during
this cursory search.262 It would be impossible for the contraband
nature of the pill bottle to be immediately apparent to the officer,
especially because two layers of clothing and a pill bottle protect-
ed the contraband; therefore, the search would be inadmissible
under Dickerson.6 ' Likewise, the majority's reliance on the
search incident to arrest justification was tenuous at best because
the officer had no other articulable justification for an arrest."
The dissent used the factors enumerated by the majority to
create probable cause to illustrate the vague, fact-specific justifi-
cation for the search.266 Chief Justice Brickley contended that
"[pleople with past legal troubles travel the streets of high-crime
257. See id. (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
258. See id. (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
259. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (citation omitted).
260. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378; Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
261. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 865 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 865-66 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 865 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 866-68 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting). The factors that the majority
found compelling to determine probable cause were the same factors used by the
dissent to invalidate the search. Chief Justice Brickley found the majority's reliance
on the defendant's behavior most troubling as he stated that the defendant's actions
of placing "his hands in his sweatpants did nothing to distinguish him as a crimi-
nal. Indeed, while placing his hands in his pants may rightly be considered in bad
taste, I am aware of no law that punishes individuals for such an exercise of poor
manners." Id. at 868 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 869 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
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areas every day in this country, some may even prefer to walk
with their hands in their pants."266 He continued, "[t]his behav-
ior should not give rise to a finding of probable cause merely be-
cause someone half a block away fled at the sight of a police
car."
267
Likewise, the dissent examined the nature of the individual's
privacy interest intruded upon during the officer's search, ques-
tioning "if individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their groin, where do they have such an expecta-
tion?"2" Using this line of analysis, Chief Justice Brickley at-
tacked the majority's implication that Mr. Champion's desire for
privacy by keeping his hands in his pants justified the officer's
intrusive search.26 9 Ultimately, Chief Justice Brickley used this
privacy interest as the linchpin of his argument, determining that
"[lit is unclear, given that defendant has a police record and lives
in a poor neighborhood, what the Constitution permits him to do,
if the simple act of putting his hands down his pants jettisons his
constitutional rights."270 The application of the standard advo-
cated by the majority infringes upon the constitutional rights of
suspects, especially those individuals unfortunate enough to live
in high-crime areas. The dissent concluded that the majority
incorrectly admitted the evidence against the defendant and cre-
ated a confusing line of analysis to arrive at its conclusion. 1
266. Id. at 868 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
267. Id. (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 871 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
269. See id. (Brickley, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Brickley noted, "[wihile it is
true that persons engaged in illegal transactions will desire to conceal those transac-
tions, the desire for privacy in one's affairs is common among law-abiding persons as
well." Id. at 870 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Green, 670
F.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The court in United States v. Green determined
that "the police cannot conclude that merely because an object or a transaction is
not openly displayed, it is necessarily illegal." Green, 670 F.3d at 1152. Following
this logic, Chief Justice Brickley demonstrated that this was an unfair inference by
the police because it clearly intruded upon the rights of the suspect. See Champion,
549 N.W.2d at 871 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
270. Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 871 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
271. See id. at 872 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
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CRITICISMS OF CHAMPION: THE CONFLICTING RESULTS OF AN
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF DICKERSON
Relying on the Officer's Tactile Perception to Support an
Intrusive Search
Following the precedent of both the Terry and Dickerson deci-
sions, the Michigan Supreme Court relied heavily on the officer's
training and ability to perceive contraband through multiple
layers of clothing. 72 Relying on the officer's ability to distin-
guish between contraband and noncontraband in a cursory
search is too speculative of a trend to be allowed by the
courts.273 Although an officer's training certainly would height-
en his tactile perception,274 using his touch as the sole justifi-
cation for an intrusion on individuals' Fourth Amendment rights
cuts contrary to the Fourth Amendment's history.275
The courts' reliance on the officer's experience in this area is
troubling because the court implies that the more experience an
officer has, the less likely he is to violate the suspect's rights.276
Unfortunately, this inference cannot always be made. Similarly,
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals'
rights against unbridled police discretion at any level, regardless
of the officer's tenure on the police force.277 Although an experi-
enced officer may be able to more accurately perceive contraband,
even through bulky layers of clothing, experience alone should not
afford officers the ability to conduct extensive searches with little
more than suspicions of criminal behavior. This wide-reaching
discretion is problematic especially because the probable cause
272. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 859. But
see Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (holding that the officer's touch
was too manipulative to justify the admissibility of the fruit of the search).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 164-80.
274. See State v. Wonders, 929 P.2d 792 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). "When objects have
a distinctive and consistent feel and shape that an officer has been trained to detect
and has previous experience in detecting, then touching these objects provides the
officer with the same recognition his sight would have produced." Id. at 801 (citing
United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1989)).
275. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 222-23.
276. See Andrews v. State, 471 S.E.2d 567, 568-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (justifying
the search and seizure of contraband on the basis of the officer's seven years of
experience).
277. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 213-24.
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determinations, which justify the searches, rely more on the qual-
ity of the neighborhood than on the suspect's actual criminal
behavior during the police confrontation.278
The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to preserve indi-
vidual privacy and personal liberty in response to their concern
with the political turmoil and excessive police discretion during
the 1760s and 1770s.179 Today, these concerns continue as the
police use the patdown search to justify initiating police contact
with suspicious individuals.28 In turn, the Court has been
sympathetic to both the safety concerns of the officers and to the
public's cries against crime. The Court has allowed a balancing
test, weighing many factors, to determine the disruption of a
suspect's fundamental right.2"'
Fourth Amendment case law relating specifically to warrant-
less searches is extremely troubling. Although the text of the
Constitution clearly delineates the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches, 2 the Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment less strictly." The Fourth Amendments guaran-
278. See People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 747 (1997) (outlining factors the court used to justify the officer's probable
cause determination).
279. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 44-45.
280. See, e.g., Katherine M. Skiba, 'Zero Tolerance' for Crime, Houston Moves to
Sweep up Gangs, Sees the Statistics Drop, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 1996,
at 1, available in 1996 WL 7838708 (illustrating vigorous police tactics with a "get
tough on crime" attitude as Houston police enforce even minor offenses as the pre-
requisite to conducting a Terry patdown); Street Searches Increase, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 8, 1995, at B1, available in 1995 WL 6067568 (increasing the
use of Terry patdowns to fight crime and describing the need to educate officers on
the legal ramifications of such searches).
281. See infra note 284 (discussing the Court's treatment of different rights with
varying levels of scrutiny); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-76
(1993) (defining the scope of a plain feel search in terms of "reasonableness"); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (addressing the need for a balancing test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the officer's conduct during a stop and frisk search);
Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 858-59 (proceeding under a totality of the circumstances
analysis to determine the intrusiveness of the search).
282. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
283. See, e.g., Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (defining a plain feel exception to the
Fourth Amendment); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (plu-
rality opinion) (creating a plain view exception to the warrant requirement); Chimel
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tees relate most importantly to those individuals who may lose
their liberty as the result of improper searches; therefore, these
rights should receive the same heightened scrutiny analysis that
other enumerated rights receive. Instead, the Supreme Court
has determined that because these rights generally relate to
criminals, the rights merely deserve a balancing test, similar to
a rational basis inquiry." This line of analysis produces a
markedly different result, one generally supporting the police
conduct rather than favoring the individual right at stake.2"
Containing One's Privacy Expectations: How Much Privacy Do
Closed Containers Receive?
Generally, items located within containers receive the highest
level of privacy afforded by the Supreme Court. 6 In California
v. Acevedo," 7 the Court limited this privacy expectation by re-
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (allowing provisions for a search incident
to an arrest of a suspect); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27 (allowing a cursory patdown
search for weapons of a suspect).
284. Ironically, individuals whose liberty may be taken away through imprisonment
receive only a balancing test to ensure the maintenance of some of these rights. In-
dividuals who are merely exercising their rights to freedom of speech, religion, and
assembly, however, receive much greater constitutional protection through the use of
heightened scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free-
dom of religion); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (freedom of speech);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (freedom of assembly).
Likewise, the Court has afforded greater protection to rights that are not clearly
enumerated in the Constitution, such as the right to privacy, see, eg., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny for the right to privacy); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same), than rights that the Constitution enumer-
ates in the Fourth Amendment, such as the right to be free from an unreasonable
search and seizure; although in other areas of constitutional rights affecting crimi-
nals, the Court has interpreted the relevant Amendments explicitly and absolutely.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interpreting the constitutional
guarantees of the right to counsel and the freedom from self-incrimination); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (interpreting the Sixth Amendment's provision
for guaranteed counsel).
285. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (rejecting the search as un-
reasonable but creating a balancing test to determine the -intrusiveness of such a
search); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27 (balancing the suspect's rights against the officer's
rights to safety in determining the limits on the scope of a patdown search for
weapons).
286. See Place, 462 U.S. at 700-01.
287. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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fusing to extend a privacy interest to closed containers located in
automobiles.' Traditionally, automobile searches received
lower standards of privacy, given the exigent circumstances sur-
rounding these searches."5 Even in Acevedo, the Court ac-
knowledged the greater expectation of privacy in a container
carried with oneself, such as a purse, briefcase, or luggage."
Using this logic, the search in Champion should have received
more heightened scrutiny protection by the court because the
search affected a container carried by the suspect."' The court,
however, reasoned that the officer could legitimately open the
pill bottle if, based on the totality of the circumstances, he be-
lieved the suspect was committing a crime. 92 Yet, the officer
used very general factors to justify his search, factors that would
justify the search of any suspect who happens to be in a high-
crime area, although the same suspect in a low-crime area
would most likely not be subjected to such an intrusive
search.29
3
The majority in Champion failed to analyze the suspect's pri-
vacy expectations surrounding the container he carried.2" Mr.
288. See id. at 578-79.
289. See id at 569 (discussing an exception to the warrant requirement for mobile
vehicles).
290. See id. at 580.
291. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703 (describing the analysis for the search of a contain-
er carried by a suspect); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 862 (Mich. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997) (allowing the search of the container carried by
Mr. Champion in his pants).
292. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 860.
293. See id. at 861; supra notes 244-54 and accompanying text.
294. Although Place, 462 U.S. at 696, held that an individual does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in contraband, the Champion majority ignored that
the officer could not determine conclusively the contraband nature of the pill bottle
until he actually opened the container. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 858-59. Given
that individuals use a prescription pill bottle to carry legal items, the officer and the
court should have respected the defendant's privacy interest in the container, waiting
to search the pill bottle until the officer obtained a search warrant. This process
ensures that a suspect's rights remain intact because a neutral magistrate must de-
termine if the circumstances enumerated by the officer constitute probable cause to
search the suspect. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Likewise, with the growth in acceptance of telephone warrants, the police need
only call a judge on the telephone in order to obtain a search warrant. See Daniel
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Champion clearly believed he had a privacy interest in the con-
tainer, especially because he did not hold the container to public
view and because he carried the pill bottle in a very private ar-
ea. 5 This privacy expectation is similar to one's interest in the
contents of a purse or briefcase carried with an individual, a pri-
vacy interest that is "self-evident."296 As Professor Tracey Macin
noted, "[pirivate containers are typically not transparent for a
reason-individuals do not wish disclosure of their contents."2"
The court in Champion ignored this entire line of analysis in
favor of a reasonableness balancing test, despite the Supreme
Court's extension of greater Fourth Amendment protection to
containers.29  This reasonableness determination, however,
should not arise in this situation because the scope of the search
clearly exceeded the limits established in Dickerson.29 The po-
lice conduct in Dickerson exceeded the bounds of a plain feel
search because the officer admitted to manipulating the contra-
band with his fingers during the patdown.30 Likewise, the po-
lice conduct in Hicks caused a violation of the suspect's privacy
rights because the police moved potential contraband to deter-
mine its illegal nature."'
If the court rejected those manipulations, then the Michigan
Supreme Court should have rejected the intrusive search of Mr.
Champion, which involved the opening of a container he was
carrying in his pocket."° The court's failure to reject this
L. Rotenberg, On Seizures and Searches, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 325 n.9 (1995)
(discussing the use of telephone warrants and the circumstances under which such
warrants may be issued). Although problems do exist with these warrants, including
the length of time a suspect may be detained while waiting for a warrant and the
difficulty of reviewing the justifications for the warrant on appeal, telephone war-
rants are growing in popularity and acceptance. The Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure even authorize such a procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2). With this
quick, easy process available, the court's failure to require a warrant in situations
such as Champion trivializes the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
295. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 870-71 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
296. Maclin, supra note 1, at 230.
297. Id.
298. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 859.
299. See id. at 865 (Brickley, C.J., dissenting).
300. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993).
301. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
302. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 852.
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search illustrates the difficult precedent established by
Dickerson. The Supreme Court must revisit this issue as many
jurisdictions discard individual's privacy interests in favor of a
reasonableness determination based on a balancing test of the
surrounding circumstances." 3
Using Fact-Specific Decisions to Ignore Larger Legal Issues
Underlying the Cases
After delineating rather explicit guidelines for patdown
searches for weapons and for contraband, many jurisdictions are
unwilling to use these standards as bright-line rules.3 Favor-
ing an approach that instead uses individual circumstances to
distinguish these cases, many courts carved their interpretations
into the Supreme Court's established doctrines." 5 Using this
alternative analysis affords the courts greater flexibility to de-
cide cases and to allow greater deference to the law enforcement
community. This approach, however, removes consistency from
the judicial decision-making process, producing contradictory
decisions in each jurisdiction.05
By focusing specifically on facts that differentiate the case
before them, the courts have created fact-specific case law, leav-
ing little room for the tradition of stare decisis and the goal of
consistency in the realm of Fourth Amendment case law. In-
stead, a criminal defendant contesting a search must hope that
the circumstances that distinguish his case are such that the
officer's conduct was inappropriate. Ironically, the Dickerson
decision focused on the inappropriateness of the police conduct
303. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
304. See id.
305. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 374-76; Champion, 549 N.W.2d 858-59; see also
supra text accompanying notes 157-218 (illustrating the disparate outcomes resulting
from different interpretations of Dickerson's plain feel standard).
306. 'The ad hoc approach [to Fourth Amendment cases] not only makes it difficult
for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority . . . ; it also creates a danger
that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced." Oliver v. Unit-
ed States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (citation omitted).
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in that instance;. 7 yet, most of the cases following the estab-
lishment of the plain feel doctrine have reached an opposite
conclusion, siding with law enforcement.0 8
In cases such as Champion, involving closed containers, juris-
dictions once again remain split as to the precedential value of
Dickerson's probable cause requirement that the contraband be
immediately apparent to the officer conducting the search.00
Analyzing the intrusiveness of the search in Dickerson in com-
parison to the search in Champion, it seems utterly ridiculous
that courts can conclude that the search in Dickerson was more
intrusive. 10 The officer merely squeezed contraband while
feeling through the defendant's jacket in Dickerson;11 howev-
er, in Champion, an officer blatantly opened a closed container
carried by the individual after reaching inconclusive results
from his patdown." This distinction resulted from the court's
enumeration of many factors that created the basis for a proba-
ble cause determination by the officer in Champion."3 In real-
ity, these factors are merely the court's attempt at manipulating
the fact pattern to differentiate the case slightly from Dickerson
so as to reach a completely contradictory, pro-law enforcement
result. 4
Advancing Social Policies Through Search and Seizure Decisions
Because crime rates continue to skyrocket and drugs continue
to pervade American culture, judicial opinions have addressed
307. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 164-218.
309. See the discussion of privacy in closed containers, supra text accompanying
notes 112-21.
310. See supra notes 255-71 and accompanying text.
311. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378.
312. See People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 860-61 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 747 (1997).
313. See id. at 862.
314. See id. at 859 (enumerating factors that justified the arrest). But see People v.
Massey, 558 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, 567 N.W.2d 251
(Mich. 1997) (distinguishing Champion's probable cause factors on very fact-specific
grounds, including the officer's recognition of the suspect as a "schoolmate," the lack
of "suspicious behavior," and the lack of testimony concerning the crime statistics of
the neighborhood in which the arrest occurred).
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these concerns.315 Unfortunately, these concerns tend to out-
weigh other equally important concerns, such as the individual's
privacy interest and the fundamental underpinnings of the
Fourth Amendment relating to the individual's freedom.16
Courts quickly began to delineate circumstances under which an
individual has a lower expectation of privacy-the circumstances
that produced probable cause for the majority in Champion. 7
Unfortunately, these standards, even when viewed under the
totality of circumstances approach, do not always produce a
result that is consistent with the citizens' constitutional
rights.
318
The location of the search, such as a high-crime neighborhood,
the prior criminal record of the suspect, the activity of other
individuals in the area at the time of the police confrontation,
and the reaction of the suspect to the police are all factors used
to justify these more intrusive searches.39 These standards,
however, are arbitrary and inherently discriminatory based on
socioeconomic circumstances because most convicted felons gen-
erally return to live in the neighborhood in which they lived
prior to their conviction.320 Following this line of analysis, con-
315. See State v. White, 674 N.E.2d 405, 411 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). The court in
White invalidated the search of Mr. White; however, the court acknowledged the im-
portance of fighting crime through judicial decision making. See id.
316. The court used officers' safety or crime prevention as the justifications for
warrantless searches in Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23
(1968), and Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 853-54. Yet, in each case, the privacy expecta-
tion of the individual diminished with the increased scope of the warrantless search
advocated by the courts.
317. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 853 (using general factors to create probable
cause for warrantless searches).
318. See id. at 862 (allowing the admission of contraband seized during the search
of a container, a search that arguably was beyond the scope of Dickerson).
319. See id. at 853.
320. See Tucker Carlson, Town Criers Need to Track Ex-cons, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, May 1, 1995, at 34, available in 1995 WL 12332172 (detailing city efforts to
notify residents of the return of an offender to a neighborhood following release from
prison); John J. DiIulio, Jr., Moral Poverty: The Coming of the Super-Predators
Should Scare Us into Wanting to Get to the Root Causes of Crime a Lot Faster, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 15, 1995, at 31, available in 1995 WL 13111020 (discussing juvenile
offenders' crime statistics and the tendency for violence as a root cause of the pover-
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victed felons and low-income individuals who cannot afford to
leave the high-crime neighborhood in which they reside have a
lesser expectation of privacy interests under the Fourth Amend-
ment, according to some courts.3 2'
This discrimination resembles the redlining that many finan-
cial institutions allegedly implemented in an effort to assign
different mortgage rates to homes depending on the character of
the neighborhood in which the home was located."s The courts
correctly were skeptical of this argument and required statistics
or other factual support to prove that the redlining actually
occurred."s Finding that these guidelines are economically
rather than racially motivated, courts established tougher stan-
dards to prove redlining." Analogizing financial redlining to
the totality of the circumstances approach used by courts con-
struing Dickerson's plain feel exception, the accusation of poten-
tial redlining should be taken seriously." "Police redlining"
directly infringes upon the constitutional rights of the accused in
the search and seizure context by using the location of the po-
tential crime as the basis for the intrusiveness of the search.
Following the totality of circumstances approach advocated by
the court in Champion, individuals who live in specific neighbor-
hoods immediately become an easy target for overzealous police.
By using a balancing test that measures the intrusion on the
individual against society's interests in protecting the safety of
ty in which the offenders live and return following incarceration); Marcus Montoya,
Crips Get Hooks in Springs, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 21, 1994, at
B1, available in 1994 WL 8584869 (describing a recent phenomenon of gang mem-
bers moving to small towns but retaining their connections with their previous
neighborhoods).
321. See, e.g., Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 858-59 (using these factors in an attempt
to formulate a probable cause determination to justify the officer's search of the pill
bottle).
322. See Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ind.
1987).
323. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1559 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996).
324. See id.
325. Courts construing Dickerson's plain feel requirements using a totality of the
circumstances analysis include People v. Mitchell, 630 N.E.2d 451 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Drake v. State, 655 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wonders, 929
P.2d 792 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, (Mar. 18, 1997); Champion, 549
N.W.2d at 853; and State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1994).
1044
AD HOC ADJUDICATION
police officers and decreasing crime, the courts were all too will-
ing to let this intrusion pass the balance, weighing in favor of
law enforcement. 26 As the historical underpinnings of the
Fourth Amendment illustrate, this line of reasoning is unfairly
discriminatory, relying on arbitrary factors that are not proven
to be dispositive of criminal potential, 27 leaving individuals in
crime-ridden neighborhoods with a lower expectation that their
Fourth Amendment rights will be protected. 2
FUTURE APPLICATION OF DICKERSON
After reviewing the disparate results reached by state courts
attempting to analyze the Dickerson plain feel standards, the
Supreme Court must clarify this exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment. 29 Because the state courts have produced contradictory
results by relying on a wide range of neutral factors to decide if
seized contraband was immediately apparent to the officer, the
Dickerson decision can no longer be left to fact-specific interpre-
tation and analysis.3 ° Within this lack of definition, a
suspect's rights vary significantly from state to state and from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 3 '
The Dickerson decision relies on the officer's ability to identify
contraband immediately; however, the officer searching Mr.
Dickerson failed to meet this requirement.3 2 By using this
vague, undefined standard of immediate apparentness, the
Dickerson majority effectively enumerated a requirement that in
practice is virtually impossible to meet. This requirement paral-
326. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968) (allowing a patdown search of a
suspect because of his location and his furtive behavior); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at
858-59 (admitting evidence obtained through a seizure justified on the location of the
suspect, the location of the contraband, and the suspect's nervousness around the
police officer).
327. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 31-45 (discussing English abuses of the writ of
assistance as the impetus for the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
328. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23; Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 858-59.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
332. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993).
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lels the plain view guidelines; however, an authorized warrant
or exception originally justifies the plain view search. 3 1 Simi-
larly, during a plain view search, an officer views the contra-
band in his line of sight before seizing the item.3
Dickerson searches reach contraband in a much more decep-
tive form.3 5 The contraband produced from a plain feel search
lies within the clothing of a suspect, sometimes hidden by multi-
ple layers of clothing.3 ' The doctrine's requirement of immedi-
ate apparentness is nearly impossible for officers to meet be-
cause of often multiple layers of insulation.
Many state courts created factors to aid in interpreting the
immediately apparent requirement of the plain feel doctrine; yet,
these factors are inconclusive in determining if such contraband
actually falls within the scope of an allowable plain feel
search..3 " Rather, these factors produce inconsistent re-
sults. 8' The Court itself acknowledged the problems with a
totality of the circumstances analysis in the Fourth Amendment
context by admitting there are "difficulties created for courts,
police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual
circumstances." 339 Given this disparity, the Supreme Court
must revisit Dickerson and reformulate new guidelines for an
allowable plain feel search.
A plain feel search merely extends the Terry patdown by al-
lowing officers to seize contraband in addition to weapons found
during the search.34 The premise of such a search is justifiable
given the rising crime rates across the country, especially in re-
333. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
334. See id.
335. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 369.
336. See id.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
339. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
340. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76. The Court's delineation of the plain feel
doctrine did not expand the allowable scope of a patdown significantly. "Officers
must remember that, even after Dickerson, a frisk is still a limited patdown for
weapons only, not for narcotics. Finding narcotics during a protective frisk is merely
a bonus." Kevin Corr, Debunking the Myths: A Compendium of Law Enforcement
Misconceptions, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 133 (1995).
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lationship to illegal narcotics.3" Although the Court's goal of
fighting crime was laudable, the methods the Court crafted to
promote such a goal created confusion. Rather than allowing an
officer to seize immediately the contraband he discovers, the
plain feel doctrine should require the officer to obtain a search
warrant prior to the seizure. With the advent of telephone war-
rants that may be obtained quickly while detaining the suspect,
probable cause determinations can be made by a neutral magis-
trate. 2 This process echoes the Framers' belief that a de-
tached observer would protect the suspect's rights in such in-
stances."3 Modifying the plain feel doctrine to require a war-
rant before seizure of potential' narcotics would decrease an
officer's discretion concerning such searches and move these
searches away from their current ad hoc state.3"
Because individual liberty is at stake, the warrant require-
ment is a minimal intrusion on the officer's efficiency and discre-
tion during an arrest. Likewise, the justification for a plain feel
search is less compelling than the traditional warrantless
searches.' 5 Requiring a warrant for a plain feel search would
341. See John Commin , City's Crime Rate Shoots Up 6%; Drugs Blamed, NASH-
VILLE BANNER, Mar. 7, 1991, at Al, available in 1997 WL 7334141; Vicki Ferstel,
Expert Says Rural Officers at Greater Risk for Assault, BATON ROUGE ADvOC., Feb.
13, 1997, at 8A, available in 1997 WL 7234846; Dan Rozek, DuPage Sheriff Stands
by Indicted Officers, Cm. SUN-TImIs, Mar. 23, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL
6342393.
342. See Rotenberg, supra note 294, at 325 n.9.
343. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 41-43; Macin, supra note 1, at 213-14.
344. The Court itself acknowledged that Fourth Amendment case law should be
more than "subtle nuances and hairline distinctions." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181 (citing
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne LaFave, "Case-By-
Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142)). The Court in Oliver warned of the dangers of a case-by-
case approach to the Fourth Amendment because "police officers would have to guess
before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted
a sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently
secluded to establish a right of privacy." Id.
345. Justifications for warrantless searches include the preservation of evidence, see
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), and the protection of the officer's
safety, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). Ironically, officer efficiency justifies
a plain feel search, a search that has become even more intrusive than other war-
rantless searches justified by more compelling state interests. See Dickerson, 508
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decrease the confusion and inconsistency that have resulted
following the creation of the doctrine in Dickerson.4 '
CONCLUSION
In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,3 47 Jus-
tice Brandeis concluded, "[c]rime is contagious. If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in-
vites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anar-
chy.""5 By allowing the government to intrude into the most
private of places and obtain evidence against a man, the govern-
ment merely authorizes a clear violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In its zeal to fight crime, the government has overlooked
the fundamental limits on convicting criminals. Because the
Court delineated many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,
officers have begun pressing the line to attempt to see how far
the limits of the Fourth Amendment may be pushed. 9 These
attempts, although seeking to promote society's interest in fight-
ing crime, are unjust when applied in a manner inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment.
The Court enumerated the considerations that must exist for
a Terry stop as well as for a seizure of other contraband felt
during such a patdown search."' 0 Yet, clear restrictions exist
on the use of such evidence, and in the case of the plain feel
doctrine, the contraband must be immediately apparent to the
officer's touch.35' In Champion, it was virtually impossible for
the officer to immediately identify the nature of the item as con-
traband because the defendant had contraband within a pill
bottle in his pants.352 The warrantless search was unjustified;
however, following a convoluted analysis, the court nevertheless
U.S. at 375-76.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 157-218.
347. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
348. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
349. See supra note 280 (discussing new ideas in vigorous law enforcement tactics
aimed at reducing crime and increasing Terry patdown searches).
350. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
351. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
352. See People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 866 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 747 (1997).
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admitted the evidence.353
In its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court took a major step
toward breeding of contempt for the law, which Justice Brandeis
warned against. It is within the permutations and reinterpreta-
tions of the Fourth Amendment that individuals' rights cede to
the all-powerful state, just the type of intrusion the Framers
attempted to avoid when drafting the Bill of Rights. " Requir-
ing a warrant for a plain feel search moves such a search away
from an intrusion on the suspect's rights and ensures that
individual's rights remain intact during an investigation.
Justice Brandeis warned of such a problem when he stated,
"[mien born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liber-
ty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding."355 It is the responsibility of the
courts and the judicial process to guard against this encroach-
ment, and when the courts do not act in that role, the
individual's rights are trampled.
Audra A Dial
353. See i& at 858-61 (applying the plain feel and search incident to arrest doctrines).
354. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 41-42; Maclin, supra note 1, at 209.
355. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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